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“SOFT LAW” IS A PUZZLE. It shapes a wide range of public decision making, but its

contents are said to lie beyond the rule of law. “Hard law” is legislative in nature,
including regulations issued under delegated authority or other forms of delegated
by-law or rule making. Soft law covers just about all the other instruments that
are issued by the executive to guide its decision making, including guidelines,
codes, manuals, circulars, directives, bulletins, and other forms.
Those who interpret and apply public law generally view the guidelines,
codes, manuals, circulars, and other instruments that make up soft law through
binary lenses. Either these instruments are “law,” or they are not “law.” If deemed
to be “law,” these instruments and their content bind public decision makers,
and their contents are subject to judicial oversight. If not “law,” these instruments
express policy goals, guiding principles, the views and perspectives of public
bodies or decision makers, and accountability over how they are used may be
sought only through administrative and political avenues.
In this article, we argue that a sharp binary dichotomy between “hard law”
and “soft law” may be appealing as a basis for differentiating instruments that are
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legislative from those that are not. However, a binary approach glosses over the
reality of the multi-faceted roles played by soft law in Canadian public law.
This is not to say that distinctions between hard law and soft law do not exist,
or that they do not matter. The primacy of legislative authority is a case in point.
For example, soft law cannot extend beyond or contradict the statutory authority
of the decision-making body or otherwise usurp the role of the legislature in
setting the legal boundaries for decision making.1
However, beyond this point of departure within the rule of law of a
democracy, soft law is a setting where legality and lived reality often diverge. For
example, there are settings where a statute sets out the decision maker’s scope of
authority in vague ways, and it is the guidelines that flesh out that authority and
indicate how decision makers will apply their authority.
Despite the practical effects of soft law in driving public decision making,
soft law is not subject to the same constitutional constraints as hard law. In Little
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (“Little Sisters”),
the Supreme Court of Canada held that manuals and guidebooks are not “law” and
are therefore not reviewable for Charter compliance.2 This categorical approach
to soft law, however, overlooks its practical role in driving administrative decision
making. To suggest that the statute must accord with constitutional standards,
but the guideline need not, gives rise to dissonance between what matters to
judges overseeing public decision making, and what matters in shaping public
decisions. In our view, such a divergence is neither healthy nor sustainable for a
legal system, nor fair or just for those whose rights and aspirations turn on how
soft law is developed and used.
Further, because soft law is not a product of legislative accountability and may
lie beyond the scope of judicial oversight, it presents a compelling challenge to
key public law principles, including the rule of law and the separation of powers.3
In recent years, courts have struggled to reconcile the “unreviewability”
of soft law with its practical effect on decision making. Indeed, a decade after
Little Sisters, the Court distanced itself from the proposition that soft law was
categorically immune from Charter review. In Greater Vancouver Transportation
Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students—British Columbia Component,
1.
2.
3.

For example, if a statute gives a decision maker the authority to admit refugees based on
risk of persecution in their country of origin, a guideline cannot extend the decision maker’s
authority to admit refugees whether or not risk of persecution is apparent.
2000 SCC 69 at para 85 [Little Sisters].
See Greg Weeks, “Soft Law and Public Liability: Beyond the Separation of Powers?” (2018)
39 Adel L Rev 303. See generally Greg Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities: Remedies
and Reform (Hart, 2016) [Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities].
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the Court held that a policy qualified as “law” and must therefore comply with
the Charter (“Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority”).4 In the wake of
these conflicting decisions, courts continue to wrestle with the uncertain status
of soft law in a variety of administrative and constitutional contexts. What courts
currently lack is a cohesive framework with which to characterize and respond to
soft law instruments.
This issue matters because soft law, simply put, is everywhere. The number,
variety, complexity, and impact of soft law dwarfs that of statutes and regulations.5
While statutes are drafted to last years, if not decades, soft law is intended to
be flexible, easily updated, and easily revised, with little to no procedural
requirements for amendment.6
Attempting to define soft law, therefore, is perilous. While we generally refer
to soft law “instruments,” a focus on the source of soft law may be less helpful
than a focus on the effect. As Robin Creyke and John McMillan observed, soft law
takes effect through influence, not through the expression of positive law.7 Soft
law sometimes comes in the form of a guideline but may also take more informal
forms. To take just one example, guidance on the interpretation of what is and is
not a charitable entity was placed in the employee handbook of tax officials.8 Soft
law may not even always be written, and it can develop through shared practices
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

2009 SCC 31 [Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority].
See generally Robin Creyke & John McMillan, “Soft Law v Hard Law” in Linda Pearson,
Carol Harlow & Michael Taggart, eds, Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in
Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart, 2008) 377; Richard Rawlings, “Soft Law Never Dies” in
Mark Elliott & David Feldman, eds, The Cambridge Companion to Public Law (Cambridge
University Press, 2015) 215; Lorne Sossin & Charles W Smith, “Hard Choices and Soft Law:
Ethical Codes, Policy Guidelines and the Role of the Courts in Regulating Government”
(2003) 40 Alta L Rev 867; Greg Weeks, “The Use and Enforcement of Soft Law by
Australian Public Authorities” (2014) 42 Federal L Rev 181. There is a broader literature on
the growth and importance of soft law in international governance, which lies beyond the
focus of this study. See e.g. Steven L Schwarcz, “Soft Law as Governing Law” (2020) 104
Minn L Rev 2471.
Even regulations, by contrast, are often issued for notice and comment, pass by a
Parliamentary committee, and may be subject to debate before being issued and
formally published.
Creyke & McMillan, supra note 5 at 379.
See Lorne Sossin, “Regulating Virtue: A Purposive Approach to the Administration of
Charities” in Jim Phillips, Bruce Chapman & David Stevens, eds, Between State and Market:
Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001)
373 at 380-82. On the proliferation of more formal soft law in the area of taxation, see
generally Sas Ansari & Lorne Sossin, “Legitimate Expectations in Canada: Soft Law and
Tax Administration” in Matthew Groves & Greg Weeks, eds, Legitimate Expectations in the
Common Law World (Hart, 2017) 293.
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in a decision-making body, passed on through training, mentoring, and meetings.
In Langenfeld v. TPSB (“Langenfeld”),9 for example, a “practice” instituted by
the Chief of Police to search members of the public before permitting their entry
into police headquarters was an unjustifiable infringement of the Charter.10
Our aim in tackling the puzzle of soft law is to develop a framework that
responds to the breadth of the mechanisms for ordering public decision making
that are not contained in the statutes and regulations that constitute “hard law.”
Too often, the vastness and variety of soft law can give rise to the view that
there is no role for courts, or for the rule of law generally, in this sphere. In our
view, this theoretical approach is no longer tenable (if it ever was), as it ignores
the practical significance of soft law for those who make decisions and the lived
reality of individuals who are affected by those decisions. Simply put, where soft
law is the driver of discretionary decision making, it should be the focus of legal
accountability.11
Our analysis considers just the tip of the soft law iceberg—the legal treatment
of soft law instruments. Below the water line, there are more significant and
opaque areas to explore, including how and why public authorities develop soft
law, its role in how public authorities communicate and act, and what impact
different sources of authority and influence have on discretionary decisions
and decision makers. While these questions lie beyond the focus of this article,
it would be wrong to suggest one can grapple with soft law without addressing
these questions in some way if the practical influence of soft law is to align with
its legal treatment.
Our goal is not to present a comprehensive theory of soft law. Rather, we seek
to examine the challenges that courts encounter when engaging with soft law and
the current uneven treatment of soft law in Canadian jurisprudence. We lay the
groundwork for a new approach to the review of soft law, which better equips
courts to move beyond formalistic labels and to respond to the influence of soft
law in practice. Our proposed framework builds on the important theoretical

9. 2018 ONSC 3447 [Langenfeld].
10. Justice Copeland found that this violated the applicant’s section 2(b) right to attend
a public Toronto Police Services Board meeting. Section 8 was not argued. See ibid at
paras 69-70, 157.
11. On the challenges of accountability in the context of soft law, see generally Robin Creyke,
“‘Soft Law’ and Administrative Law: A New Challenge” (2010) 61 AIALF 15.
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work of others, particularly in the international law sphere, who have sought to
go beyond binary understandings of hard and soft law.12
This article is organized in three main parts. Part I is descriptive. It examines
the existing treatment of soft law in Canadian jurisprudence and the multifarious
ways that soft law currently features in judicial review. We suggest that while some
efforts have been made to bring soft law squarely within the scope of judicial
oversight, courts currently lack a unified framework with which to capture and
respond to soft law.
In Part II, we propose the foundations for a new framework to characterize
soft law, termed the “spectrum approach.” This approach aims to help courts to
respond to the influence and variations of soft law in Canadian society and to
begin to assess soft law on its own terms, rather than in relation to other concepts.
Finally, in Part III, we apply the spectrum approach to a case study involving
Ontario university free speech policies. This section illustrates the utility and
limits of our proposed framework.
Ultimately, we argue that despite the jurisprudential uncertainties
surrounding the scope and significance of soft law, it remains a powerful, practical
force in Canadian society. Accordingly, a flexible and adaptive legal framework
is necessary to bring soft law out of the shadows and subject it to meaningful
accountability.

I. IN SEARCH OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SOFT LAW
Before developing a new framework for the analysis of soft law, it is first necessary
to situate soft law in the current jurisprudence. In this Part, we review the
treatment of soft law under current Canadian public law.
While soft law often figures in judicial review, it does so only obliquely.
Situated at the periphery of judicial oversight, soft law is typically considered in
12. See e.g. Gregory C Shaffer & Mark A Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance” (2010) 94 Minn L Rev 706
at 709; David M Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, “‘Soft Law’, ‘Hard Law’ and EU
Integration” in Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, eds, Law and New Governance in the
EU and the US (Hart, 2006) 65 at 65-67. Some international law theorists, such as Shaffer
and Pollack, suggest that there are two key vantages from which soft law may be viewed:
ex ante and ex post (ibid at 715-17). From an ex ante perspective, the key issue is whether
soft law plays a role in shaping a decision, and if so, the extent of that role. From an ex
post perspective, the key issue for international law is whether the soft law agreement or
instrument in question is “enforceable.” In a domestic context, the ex post issue is whether
soft law is subject to judicial review, and if so, to what extent and in what ways. We are
interested in both of these related perspectives.
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relation to something else—be it a specific exercise of administrative decision
making or an enabling statute. While there have been some recent judicial
efforts to bring soft law into sharper focus (through doctrines such as legitimate
expectations and fettering discretion), courts are struggling to determine when
and how soft law should be subject to judicial oversight.
Below, we summarize the variety of ways that courts currently define, assess,
and respond to soft law instruments. This section begins by considering how
courts define soft law. We then consider the variety of ways that soft law is
implicated on review: as one factor in a particular administrative decision, as the
product of an enabling statute, or, in some circumstances, as an instrument in
and of itself. We then trace the development of procedural rights in relation
to soft law. Finally, we provide an overview of the nebulous remedies that are
available when challenging soft law through the courts.
This discussion below is divided into four broad topics: (1) definitions of
soft law; (2) substantive review of soft law; (3) procedural review of soft law;
and (4) remedies relating to soft law. While these categories provide a rough
frame of reference for our discussion, they should not be treated as wholly
separate inquiries. These topics are interrelated and inform one another in their
application; for example, the manner in which soft law is defined impacts the way
it is appraised on review, as well as the remedy that is ultimately selected. Because
courts lack a consistent approach to these issues, soft law has a shape-shifting
quality and is treated differently from one case to the next. Below is an account
of the multifarious ways that soft law is currently defined, assessed, and
addressed on review.
A. DEFINING SOFT LAW

There is no easily recognizable domain of Canadian public law that encompasses
soft law. It is discussed in a variety of contexts: as a question of jurisdiction or
justiciability; as a question of the application of judicial review or other legislation;
as a question of the availability of certain remedies; or simply as the backdrop for
an analysis of other administrative or constitutional law doctrines.
Soft law can be defined in several ways. For example, positivists may deny
the relevance of soft law as a legal term since law, by definition, must provide
binding rules.13 Constructivists are less interested in formalist distinctions and
more interested in the effectiveness of rules in directing decisions.14 Canadian
public law reflects elements of both approaches. On the one hand, soft law often
13. See Jan Klabbers, “The Undesirability of Soft Law” (1998) 67 Nordic J Intl L 381.
14. See Trubek, Cottrell & Nance, supra note 12 at 70-76.
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is defined by what it is not—a binding law—while on the other hand, it is defined
as a series of instruments that guide or shape legal decision making.
To date, the most comprehensive overview of the meaning of soft law comes
from the Federal Court of Appeal case Thamotharem v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (“Thamotharem”).15 Justice Evans considered
the scope of soft law in the context of a procedural guideline that applied to
refugee determination proceedings. Justice Evans described soft law as a body
of “non-legally binding” instruments such as “policy statements, guidelines,
manuals, and handbooks,” which “can assist members of the public to predict
how an agency is likely to exercise its statutory discretion” and serve as a flexible
tool for the decision-making body.16
For Justice Evans, legal rules and discretion “do not inhabit different universes
but are arrayed along a continuum.”17 Soft law is situated at this juncture between
legal rule making and discretionary decision making: “Although not legally binding
on a decision-maker in the sense that it may be an error of law to misinterpret
or misapply them, guidelines may validly influence a decision-maker’s conduct,”
and be employed as a technique “to achieve an acceptable level of consistency in
administrative decisions.”18 Justice Evans also emphasized the limits of relying on
soft law to promote consistency:
[A] decision made solely by reference to the mandatory prescription of a guideline,
despite a request to deviate from it in the light of the particular facts, may be set
aside, on the ground that the decision maker’s exercise of discretion was unlawfully
fettered.19

According to Justice Evans, such “a level of compliance may only be achieved
through the exercise of a statutory power to make ‘hard’ law, through, for
example, regulations or statutory rules made in accordance with statutorily
prescribed procedure.”20
Although courts typically draw a sharp distinction between hard law and soft
law, Justice Evans recognized that there is no clear dividing line between them.
For instance, Justice Evans observed that the term “guideline” may denote soft
15. 2007 FCA 198 [Thamotharem]. See also Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v Canada
(Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 at paras 45-49 [CARL FCA].
In CARL FCA, the Federal Court of Appeal’s discussion of soft law affirmed its approach
in Thamotharem.
16. Thamotharem, supra note 15 at paras 55-56.
17. Ibid at para 58.
18. Ibid at paras 59-60.
19. Ibid at para 62.
20. Ibid.
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law or hard law, depending on whether the public body has express authority to
issue a binding guideline.21 While statutory authority is required to issue binding
guidelines, soft law may generally be issued by decision-making bodies with or
without express statutory authority.22
This analysis suggests that although a binary opposition between soft law and
hard law is superficially appealing, on closer examination, it may not effectively
capture the shifting role of soft law in shaping administrative decisions in practice.
To take just one example, guidelines may sometimes represent a simplification
and distillation of hard law principles. So, while such guidance may come in the
form of a guideline, it reflects binding standards on decision makers.
There is a resulting difficulty in capturing the essence of a particular soft
law instrument. As noted by Justice Doherty in Ainsley Financial Corp. v.
Ontario (Securities Commission) (“Ainsley”), “There is no bright line which
always separates a guideline from a mandatory provision having the effect of
law.”23 While the complex realities of soft law suggest the need for a framework
responsive to those realities, as we discuss below, courts have struggled to develop
such an approach within the existing confines of Canadian public law.
Just as soft law is difficult to define, it is also difficult to analyze. Soft
law currently occupies an uneasy position before the courts. While hard law
can be challenged as being ultra vires, soft law is often challenged only as an
ancillary feature of a challenge to an administrative decision. That decision may
be challenged substantively, on the basis that it is an unreasonable exercise of
discretion, or procedurally, on the basis of an alleged breach of the duty of fairness.
Soft law also may itself be the subject of procedural or substantive challenges;
but, as discussed in the following sections, the uncertain status of soft law
complicates how it may arise in the judicial review framework. As H.W.R. Wade
put it, “it has no vires to be ultra.”24
B. SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW OF SOFT LAW

Soft law is typically created by administrative decision makers, who have been
delegated discretion to make decisions and issue non-legislative instruments
that prescribe rules or principles of general application. Soft law therefore
simultaneously resembles a quasi-legal instrument as well as an instance of
21.
22.
23.
24.

Ibid at paras 65-70.
Ibid at para 56.
(1994), 121 DLR (4th) 79 at 84 (Ont CA) [Ainsley].
“Beyond the Law: A British Innovation in Judicial Review” (1991) 43 Admin L Rev
559 at 561 [sic].
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delegated decision making pursuant to legislative authority. Because of soft law’s
position at the juncture of rule making and administrative action, an applicant
who is dissatisfied with a soft law instrument has, in theory, multiple avenues for
legal recourse. An aggrieved party could attack an administrative decision that
relates to the soft law instrument, the soft law instrument itself, or the legislation
or executive action that gives rise to the soft law instrument. The discussion
below expands on each avenue of judicial review.
1.

CHALLENGING A SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION THAT RELIES
ON SOFT LAW

Courts have recognized that an administrative decision may be substantively
unreasonable where a relevant soft law instrument is not followed, where a soft
law instrument fetters discretion, or where a decision influenced by soft law does
not reflect a proportionate balance of Charter protections.
The relationship between soft law and the reasonable exercise of administrative
discretion is illustrated in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (“Baker”).25 At issue in Baker was an immigration officer’s denial
of the applicant’s permanent residence application for a lack of humanitarian and
compassionate grounds.26 A majority of the Court noted that advertence to soft
law may be indicative of reasonableness:
The guidelines are a useful indicator of what constitutes a reasonable interpretation
of the power conferred by the section, and the fact that this decision was contrary to
their directives is of great help in assessing whether the decision was an unreasonable
exercise of the H & C power.27

Similarly, in Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)
(“Agraira”), the Court noted that guidelines are “a useful indicator of what
constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the…section.”28 Put simply, paying
heed to a soft law instrument may be an indicator of reasonableness, just as
failure to advert to an applicable guideline, as in Baker, may be an indicator of
unreasonableness.
In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov (“Vavilov”),
the majority of the Court discussed a decision maker’s reliance on soft law

25.
26.
27.
28.

[1999] 2 SCR 187 [Baker].
Ibid at para 4.
Ibid at para 72 [emphasis added].
2013 SCC 36 at para 28, citing Baker, supra note 25 at para 72 [Agraira].
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as a means of contributing to a “harmonized decision-making culture.”29
The majority stated that
[i]nstitutions also routinely rely on standards, policy directives and internal legal
opinions to encourage greater uniformity and guide the work of frontline decision
makers.…Where disagreement arises within an administrative body about how to
appropriately resolve a given issue, that institution may also develop strategies to
address that divergence internally and on its own initiative. Of course, consistency
can also be encouraged through less formal methods, such as the development of
training materials, checklists and templates for the purpose of streamlining and
strengthening institutional best practices, provided that these methods do not
operate to fetter decision making.30

According to the majority, as a general proposition, where a decision
maker “departs from longstanding practices or established internal authority,”
they “bear the…burden of explaining” and justifying that departure in their
reasons.31 If this burden is not met, this renders the decision unreasonable.32
A decision may also be unreasonable where a decision maker follows the
guidance of soft law without considering Charter values. An administrative
decision must reflect a proportionate balancing of Charter protections (values
and rights) with the decision maker’s statutory mandate.33 As stated in Loyola
High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), to be proportionate, the decision
must “[give] effect, as fully as possible to the Charter protections at stake given
the particular statutory mandate.”34
This approach has been applied to administrative decisions that implicate
a soft law instrument. For example, in Ewert v. Canada (Attorney General), the
Federal Court of Appeal held that the decision by correctional authorities to
deny a prisoner’s grievance was unreasonable.35 The grievance in question related
to various strip searches and the prolonged detention of a prisoner during an
institutional transfer. In denying the grievance, the decision maker noted that
the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) complied with the relevant internal

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

2019 SCC 65 at para 130 [Vavilov].
Ibid.
Ibid at para 131.
Ibid.
See Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 at paras
32, 35 [Loyola].
34. Ibid at para 39.
35. 2018 FCA 175 [Ewert FCA].
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policies and guidelines (such as the CSC’s Guidelines on Inter-Regional
Transfers by Air).36
Justice Rennie, writing for the Federal Court of Appeal, held that the
authorities were required to balance the protection flowing from sections 8 and
9 of the Charter with the relevant legislation and CSC policies.37 In this case,
Justice Rennie concluded:
I am not satisfied that this was done. The [decision maker’s] reasons for denying
the appellant’s grievance reflect a religious application of CSC policies. The reasons
do not reveal, either explicitly or implicitly, any consideration of Charter values, let
alone the balancing exercise which the jurisprudence requires.38

This failure to balance competing Charter values rendered an administrative
decision made with reference to a soft law instrument unreasonable.
2.

CHALLENGING THE SOFT LAW INSTRUMENT ITSELF

As illustrated by the previous section, legal disputes involving soft law instruments
often proceed by challenging the resulting administrative decision rather than the
soft law that gives rise to the decision. However, the jurisprudence reveals three
sets of circumstances where the soft law instrument itself has been challenged:
first, where the body issuing the soft law instrument in question exceeds its
jurisdiction;39 second, where the soft law instrument itself fetters administrative
discretion; and third, where the soft law instrument violates the Charter.
3.

JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES

Soft law has been challenged on jurisdictional grounds. In Creelman v. Canada
(Attorney General) (“Creelman”), an inmate sought judicial review of the
rejection of his grievance.40 The court accepted the applicant’s argument that
the directive relied upon by the delegate effectively altered the regulations under
the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA).41 The court found the
resulting decision to be unreasonable on this basis; however, Justice Zinn also
went further by stating that a portion of the directive was “invalid” for conflicting
with the CCRA’s regulations.42
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Ewert v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FC 47 at para 10.
See Ewert FCA, supra note 35 at paras 14, 19.
Ibid at para 20.
See Creelman v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FC 1033 [Creelman].
Ibid.
Ibid at para 32.
Ibid at paras 27, 30, 33.
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A similar analysis was applied in Ainsley.43 That case concerned a policy
statement of the Ontario Securities Commission that applied to penny
stocks.44 A group of securities dealers challenged the policy on the basis that the
Commission lacked jurisdiction to issue it.45 The court held that the Commission
had authority to implement non-statutory instruments but not mandatory
requirements.46 According to Justice Doherty, the policy in question constituted
a “de facto legislative scheme” that was imposed without appropriate statutory
authority.47 The policy was therefore declared invalid.48
Issues of jurisdiction can also overlap with the issue of fettering discretion.
In Ishaq v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (“Ishaq”), the Federal Court
of Canada considered a policy manual that required candidates to remove face
coverings when taking their citizenship oath.49 The court held that the policy,
which was presented as mandatory, constrained a citizenship judge’s scope of
action in a manner contrary to the Citizenship Regulations.50 The policy was
therefore declared invalid.51
4.

CHALLENGES FOR FETTERING DISCRETION

As demonstrated in Ishaq, soft law can also be challenged on the basis that it fetters
the exercise of administrative discretion. When public servants do not consider
soft law as a tool, but rather treat it as determinative of the decision, courts have
intervened to quash the resulting decision or invalidate the guideline itself.
The leading case on fettering discretion is Kanthasamy v. Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration).52 In that case, the Court considered guidelines developed to
assist decision makers in exercising their broad discretion to exempt people from
the consequences of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Justice Abella, writing for the Court,
acknowledged the role of guidelines in promoting reasonable administrative
decision making.53 However, she emphasized that guidelines “are ‘not legally
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Supra note 23.
Ibid at 80-81.
Ibid at 81.
Ibid at 84.
Ibid at 86.
Ibid.
2015 FC 156 [Ishaq FC], aff’d 2015 FCA 194 [Ishaq FCA].
Ibid at paras 52-53.
Ibid at para 57.
2015 SCC 61.
Ibid at para 32.
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binding’ and are ‘not intended to be…exhaustive or restrictive.’”54 While decision
makers may consider the guidelines, “[t]hey should not fetter their discretion by
treating these informal [g]uidelines as if they were mandatory requirements.”55
The Court found that the decision maker erred by treating the guidelines as a
“distinct legal test,”56 which “limit[ed] [their] ability to consider and give weight
to all relevant…considerations in a particular case.”57 The decision was therefore
unreasonable because the decision maker fettered her discretion.58
Not all fettering arguments are successful, however. In Canada (Attorney
General) v. Mavi, the Court considered the validity of an Ontario policy that
enforced the payment of sponsorship debts under the IRPA.59 The Court held
that the policy was not invalid because the procedure adopted by Ontario was
compatible with the enabling statute,60 without conflicting with the intended
scope of the decision maker’s discretion.61 The importance of policy as a guide to
public servants was recognized by the Court, as was the Minister’s entitlement to
set policy within legal limits.62
In Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) (“CARL FC”), the Federal Court found that certain “jurisprudential
guides” were invalid, in part, because they would have the effect of fettering
discretion.63 The Federal Court of Appeal disagreed and found the guides did not
fetter discretion.64 According to the Court of Appeal, the decision makers “should
be expected to know” that soft law does not constrain their decision making:
[I]t is worth reiterating that the word “guide” itself connotes the idea of a
general norm, or a tool, not meant to determine the result of any particular case:
Thamotharem, at para. 66.…Moreover, and quite apart from this Policy and the
various policy notes accompanying the designated JGs, Board members should be
expected to know the well established legal principle that soft law tools such as
guidelines are non-binding. It appears…that Board members are instructed on the
appropriate use of JGs (Appeal Book, p. 1674), and the training material [includes
similar] cautions.65
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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62.
63.
64.
65.

Ibid.
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Ibid at para 45.
Ibid at para 33 [emphasis in original].
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Taken together, these decisions affirm that courts may invalidate soft law to
the extent that such instruments improperly fetter discretion—in other words,
where they are being treated as “hard law” to the exclusion of other relevant
considerations. But where a soft law instrument is presented to decision makers
as non-binding, a fettering case may be difficult to make out on the facts.
5.

CHARTER CHALLENGES

In some circumstances, soft law has also been challenged for failing to comply
with the Charter. The issue of Charter applicability to soft law is a complex one,
even if the answer, at first blush, may seem obvious. Can soft law continue to
guide decisions if its content constitutes a breach of the Charter, section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, or the division of powers under sections 91 and 92
of the Constitution Act, 1867? Canadian courts have struggled to find a coherent
answer to this question.
i.

STARTING POINT: LITTLE SISTERS

The starting point for this analysis is the Court’s landmark decision, Little
Sisters.66 This case suggests that where an impugned instrument is not “law,”
then it falls outside the sphere of Charter scrutiny.
Little Sisters was a book shop that specialized in importing and selling
LGBTQ material. In Little Sisters, the discretionary authority at issue was the
power of customs officials to seize imported goods that met the test for obscenity
under the Criminal Code.67 The Customs Act68 and Customs Tariff69 authorized
custom officials to detain and prohibit material deemed to be obscene. The
application of the obscenity standard was further guided by two internal policy
documents: Memorandum D9-1-1 and its companion illustrated manual.70
Little Sisters challenged several provisions of the Customs Act and Customs
Tariff as infringing their section 2(b) and 15(1) rights under the Charter.71 In the
course of Justice Binnie’s judgment, he noted that “[t]he evidence established that
for all practical purposes Memorandum D9-1-1, and especially the companion
66. Little Sisters, supra note 2. For a comment on this decision, see Lorne Sossin,
“Discretion Unbound: Reconciling the Charter and Soft Law” (2002) 45 Can Public
Administration 465 at 474-83.
67. Little Sisters, supra note 2 at paras 16-18.
68. RSC 1985, c 1 (2nd Supp).
69. SC 1997, c 36.
70. See Little Sisters, supra note 2 at para 25.
71. Ibid at para 21.
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illustrated manual, governed Customs’ view of obscenity.”72 Despite this, Justice
Binnie concluded that the manual itself was not law and could not be subject to
Charter scrutiny in its own right:
[T]he trial judge put too much weight on the Memorandum, which was nothing
more than an internal administrative aid to Customs inspectors. It was not
law.…a defective Memorandum D9-1-1 may have directly contributed to a denial
of constitutional rights. It is the statutory decision, however, not the manual,
that constituted the denial. It is simply not feasible for the courts to review
for Charter compliance the vast array of manuals and guides prepared by the public
service for the internal guidance of officials. The courts are concerned with the
legality of the decisions, not the quality of the guidebooks, although of course the
fate of the two are not unrelated.73

In this passage, the Court expressed an unwillingness to review soft law for
Charter compliance because the sheer number of soft law instruments make
judicial oversight impracticable. This has the effect of insulating soft law from
Charter scrutiny by redirecting the inquiry to a specific statutory decision rather
than the instrument itself.
ii.

COMPLICATING THE PICTURE: GREATER VANCOUVER
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

Since the decision in Little Sisters, courts have continued to grapple with the
practical effects of soft law on Charter rights. Although Little Sisters expressly
indicates that soft law instruments typically fall outside the scope of Charter
review, the Court’s position on this issue is complicated almost a decade later.
In Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, the Court held that soft law
policies may qualify as “law” and must comply with the Charter.74
The applicants in that case sought to purchase advertising space for political
messaging on public transit vehicles.75 The transit authorities’ advertising policy
restricted this type of advertising.76 The applicants commenced an action alleging
that certain articles of the transit authorities’ policies violated their right to
freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.77
Justice Deschamps, writing for the majority, began her analysis by considering
whether the Charter applied to the transportation authority pursuant to section
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Ibid at para 84.
Ibid at para 85 [emphasis added].
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, supra note 4.
Ibid at para 3.
Ibid at para 4.
Ibid at para 5.
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32 of the Charter. Justice Deschamps concluded that the transit authority fell
within the purview of section 32, noting the dangers of creating a “Charter-free”
zone of delegated authority:78
[A] government should not be able to shirk its Charter obligations by simply
conferring its powers on another entity.…The devolution of provincial
responsibilities for public transit…cannot therefore be viewed as having created a
“Charter-free” zone for the public transit system in Greater Vancouver.79

Having concluded that the decision maker fell within the purview of section 32
of the Charter, Justice Deschamps treated the application of the Charter to their
advertising policies as axiomatic, writing:
Since I have established that, for the purposes of s. 32 of the Charter, the transit
authorities are government entities, it follows that the Charter applies to all their
activities, including the operation of the buses they own.80

Justice Deschamps then considered the advertising policies’ compliance with
section 2(b).81 She concluded that “the transit authorities’ policies limit the
respondents’ right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b).”82 Accordingly, “the
government must justify that limit under s. 1 of the Charter.”83
Justice Deschamps held that the impugned policies were “prescribed by law”
for the purposes of section 1 of the Charter. Justice Deschamps drew a distinction
between rules that are legislative in nature and rules that are administrative in
nature and wrote:
Where a policy is not administrative in nature, it may be “law” [for the purposes of s.
1 of the Charter] provided that it meets certain requirements. In order to be legislative
in nature, the policy must establish a norm or standard of general application that
has been enacted by a government entity pursuant to a rule-making authority. A
rulemaking authority will exist if Parliament or a provincial legislature has delegated
power to the government entity for the specific purpose of enacting binding rules
of general application which establish the rights and obligations of the individuals
to whom they apply (D. C. Holland and J. P. McGowan, Delegated Legislation
in Canada (1989), at p. 103). For the purposes of s. 1 of the Charter, these rules
need not take the form of statutory instruments. So long as the enabling legislation
allows the entity to adopt binding rules, and so long as the rules establish rights and

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Ibid at para 22.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 25 [emphasis added].
Ibid at paras 26-47.
Ibid at para 47.
Ibid.

640

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

obligations of general rather than specific application and are sufficiently accessible
and precise, they will qualify as “law” which prescribes a limit on a Charter right.
Thus, where a government policy is authorized by statute and sets out a general norm
or standard that is meant to be binding and is sufficiently accessible and precise, the
policy is legislative in nature and constitutes a limit that is “prescribed by law.”84

Justice Deschamps concluded that the transportation authorities’ advertising
policies are an example of rules that are legislative in nature and thus fall within
the purview of section 1 of the Charter. According to Justice Deschamps, “Where
a legislature has empowered a government entity to make rules, it seems only
logical, absent evidence to the contrary, that it also intended those rules to be
binding.”85 In her view, this was not a case of administrative policies that are
“meant for internal use as an interpretive aid for ‘rules’ laid down in the legislative
scheme.”86 Rather, the policies at issue were “themselves rules that establish the
rights of the individuals to whom they apply,” and were sufficiently “accessible
and precise.”87 These guidelines therefore fell within the scope of the “prescribed
by law” requirement under section 1 of the Charter.
In Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, the majority complicates
the treatment of soft law in Little Sisters in two ways. First, unlike Little Sisters,
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority indicates that where the body issuing
soft law qualifies as “government” for the purposes of section 32 of the Charter,
the soft law issued by that body must comply with the Charter.88 Second, Justice
Deschamps introduces a distinction between administrative and legislative soft
law and indicates that the latter qualifies as “law,” at least for the purpose of a
section 1 analysis. By embedding one binary (legislative versus administrative)
within another (hard law versus soft law), this case illustrates the elusive but
unsuccessful search for clear and consistent boundaries between instruments that
bind decision makers and those that do not.
iii. RESULTING JURISPRUDENTIAL UNCERTAINTY

On this question of the application of the Charter to soft law, lower courts
have been left to grapple with the differing approaches in Little Sisters and
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority. In line with Greater Vancouver
Transportation Authority, there are several cases that support the application of
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Ibid at paras 64-65.
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Ibid at para 72.
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the Charter to soft law instruments. For example, in Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Kandola, the Federal Court of Appeal suggested in the obiter that
an operational bulletin might be susceptible to a Charter challenge on the basis
that it calls for unequal treatment of children of Canadian parents, depending on
the manner in which a child is conceived.89
A similar approach was applied in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
decision Langenfeld.90 In Langenfeld (discussed in the introduction, above), the
court held that a “practice” instituted by the Chief of Police to require those
entering the police headquarters to submit to a search unjustifiably infringed
section 2(b) of the Charter.91 More recently, in R. v. Moazami, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal adjudicated a constitutional challenge pertaining to
its record and courtroom access policy.92 The court concluded that the impugned
section did not breach section 2(b) of the Charter.93
By contrast, other courts have displayed reluctance at the prospect of
reviewing soft law instruments for Charter compliance. For example, in Robinson
v. Canada (Attorney General), the applicant initiated a Charter challenge to a
fisheries licensing policy in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.94 The applicant
argued that the policy, which limited his ability to secure a medical substitute
operator authorization, infringed section 15 of the Charter.95
The primary issue in Robinson was one of jurisdiction. While the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court can decide Charter challenges to federal and provincial
legislation, the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the manner in which
federal decision makers exercise discretion.96 As a result, the characterization of
the applicant’s challenge had significant jurisdictional consequences.
Relying on Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, the applicant
argued that the Superior Court had jurisdiction because the policy was treated

89. 2014 FCA 85 at paras 70, 75.
90. Langenfeld, supra note 9.
91. Ibid at para 157. However, this case has the added wrinkle of a jurisdictional issue; the
court drew a distinction between a “policy” and “practice,” observing that only the latter
was reviewable under the Charter by a court of inherent jurisdiction (ibid at paras 35,
38). According to Justice Copeland, a “policy” would relate to an issue of the exercise of a
“statutory power of decision” and would instead fall within the jurisdiction of the Ontario
Divisional Court (ibid at paras 38, 40).
92. 2020 BCCA 350.
93. Ibid at para 118.
94. 2018 NSSC 37 [Robinson].
95. Ibid at para 2.
96. Ibid at para 12.
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as binding and was thus akin to legislation.97 The court rejected this argument,
instead characterizing the application as a challenge to the manner in which
the Minister exercised discretion.98 In doing so, the court distanced itself from
the statement in Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority that policies
that are “legislative in nature” can attract free-standing review for compliance
with the Charter.
Other cases have sidestepped the issue of Charter review entirely. In Ishaq
(see Part I(B)(2)(i), above), the applicant challenged a mandatory policy to
remove face coverings as contrary to sections 2(a) and 15 of the Charter.99 Both
the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal invalidated the
policy on jurisdictional grounds and declined to adjudicate the Charter issues on
the basis of judicial economy.100
Another line of cases has linked the review of soft law to a different binary
analysis— whether a challenge impugns action of a sufficiently public character to
meet the threshold for judicial review established in Highwood Congregation of
Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v. Wall.101 In Sprague v. Her Majesty the
Queen in right of Ontario, the Ontario Divisional Court considered a challenge
to a hospital policy and related memorandum that restricted visitors during the
early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic.102 The court held that the policy was
not sufficiently public to attract judicial review for Charter compliance:
Even where the decision at issue is exercised under a statutory power, the case law has
established that judicial review is only available where the decision is also “the kind
of decision that is reached by public law and therefore a decision to which a public
law remedy can be applied”. In Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses
(Judicial Committee) v. Wall, 2018 SCC 26, the Supreme Court explained the
limited reach of public law and judicial review and the conjunctive two-step process
as follows:
Not all decisions are amenable to judicial review under a superior court’s supervisory
jurisdiction. Judicial review is only available where there is an exercise of state
authority and where that exercise is of a sufficiently public character. Even public
bodies make some decisions that are private in nature - such as renting premises
and hiring staff - and such decisions are not subject to judicial review: Air Canada
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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v Toronto Port Authority. In making these contractual decisions, the public body
is not exercising “a power central to the administrative mandate given to it by
Parliament”, but is rather exercising a private power (ibid.). Such decisions do
not involve concerns about the rule of law insofar as this refers to the exercise of
delegated authority. (emphasis added)
…
These factors lead me to the conclusion that the Visitor Policy to restrict visitors
during the COVID-19 pandemic did not involve the exercise of a statutory authority
nor is it of a sufficiently “public” character (in the public law sense of the word) to
meet the test for judicial review.103

The court reached a similar finding in relation to the impugned Chief Medical
Officer of Health for Ontario (CMOH) Memorandum, stating:
The CMOH Memorandum does not constitute an exercise or purported exercise
of a statutory power. It was not issued pursuant to statutory authority, nor was
such authority necessary. The CMOH Memorandum has no legal force. It does not
statutorily compel any person or party to take or refrain from taking any action.
The CMOH Memorandum instead merely provides the CMOH’s recommendation
that hospitals limit visitors to “essential visitors” in order to prevent the spread
of COVID-19. While it is expected that hospitals will follow the CMOH’s
recommendation, they are not statutorily compelled to do so.104

Taken together, these cases indicate that the application of the Charter to soft law
instruments remains unsettled terrain.
6.

CHALLENGING THE LEGISLATION OR EXECUTIVE ACTION THAT GIVES
RISE TO THE SOFT LAW INSTRUMENT

Rather than reviewing the soft law instrument itself, courts have in some cases
focused their analysis on the enabling legislation or executive action that gave rise
to the soft law at issue.
In some cases, issues involving soft law have been framed as questions of
statutory interpretation. In Schmidt v. Attorney General of Canada, the applicant
sought to challenge the procedure by which the Minister of Justice would issue
a report that a proposed law was inconsistent with the Charter.105 The applicant
submitted that the Minister had adopted too high a reporting threshold. The
Federal Court of Appeal held that, in effect, this was an application for judicial
review of the Minister’s statutory interpretation of the reporting threshold (as
103. Ibid at paras 22, 24.
104. Ibid at para 31.
105. 2018 FCA 55.
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set out in the Statutory Instruments Act and the Department of Justice Act).106
The threshold adopted by the Minister was determined to be reasonable and the
application was therefore dismissed.107
Under a legislative-based analysis, a soft law instrument is sometimes viewed
as an illustration of how the legislation itself breaches a constitutional standard.
For example, in Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney
General),108 the court held that a violation of inmates’ section 12 Charter
rights did not arise from regulations, directives, and policies that provided for
administrative segregation.109 Rather, the section 12 violation arose from the
lack of procedural safeguards in the CCRA itself.110 While this legislative focus
sometimes allows courts to address the root of a Charter issue, it can run the risk
of allowing soft law instruments to disappear from judicial view.
Ultimately, the case law illustrates how soft law can emerge in a variety of
ways on review. It can be the impetus behind an administrative decision; the
product of enabling legislation; or, in some instances, the object of review in
and of itself.
C. PROCEDURAL REVIEW OF SOFT LAW

In addition to substantive review, soft law may also attract judicial review on
procedural grounds. Most often, such challenges allege that decision makers
failed to follow applicable procedural guidelines.111
In Agraira,112 for example, the Court accepted that procedural guidelines may
give rise to legitimate expectations that a particular procedure will be followed
by decision makers.113 Therefore, the failure to follow a procedural guideline can
give rise to a remedy, even if the guideline sets out a higher procedural standard
than required under the administrative law duty of fairness.
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In Thamotharem, in addition to the arguments on fettering discretion
canvassed in Part I(A), above, the Federal Court of Appeal also examined
whether the impugned guideline (which encouraged the reversal of the order of
submissions before the Immigration and Refugee Board) constituted a breach of
fairness.114 The court found that the reversal of order itself was not a violation
of the right to an oral hearing, though it could constitute a breach of fairness in
particular cases where the circumstances require an exception to the application
of the guideline.115 Therefore, the fact that Board members were not required to
follow the guideline, though expected to justify departures from it, was held to
be consistent with the Board’s duty of fairness.
Another basis for procedural challenges that engage soft law relates to the
requirement of administrative independence by decision makers. This aspect of
the duty of fairness requires that individual adjudicators be at liberty to hear
and decide cases before them, without interference in the way in which a case
is conducted or the manner in which a final decision is made.116 This ground
of accountability for soft law is closely related to the substantive ground of
fettering discretion.
The standard for administrative independence in the context of soft law
would be whether the wording of a guideline or the reliance by a decision maker
on a guideline gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
In CARL FC (discussed in Part I(B)(2)(ii), above), the Federal Court held
that a guideline may infringe the independence required of adjudicators “where
an administrative guideline or other tool goes beyond simply drawing attention
to factual information or encouraging Board members to take it into account,

114. Supra note 15.
115. Ibid at para 51.
116. See e.g. Beauregard v Canada, [1986] 2 SCR 56 at 69; IWA v Consolidated-Bathurst
Packaging Ltd, [1990] 1 SCR 282 at 332-35.
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and instead requires, induces, pressures, or coerces them to make or to follow
particular factual findings.”117
In sum, there are a number of ways in which soft law may engage a
procedural fairness analysis. Here again, however, the focus of the analysis is
primarily on the question of whether the guideline is, in practice, treated as
binding or non-binding.
This binary model arises again when considering the remedies available on
judicial review involving soft law, to which we now turn.
D. REMEDIES

There is a lack of clarity as to which remedies are available when soft law is
implicated on review. Moreover, at the remedial stage, the distinction between
challenging an administrative decision and challenging the soft law instrument
giving rise to the decision often becomes blurred.
1.

MODIFYING OR SUPPLEMENTING SOFT LAW

Where an administrative decision made pursuant to soft law is the subject of
review before the courts, an applicant may argue that the administrative decision
itself is unreasonable. In such circumstances, if the judicial review succeeds, the
court will typically quash the decision and remit the matter for reconsideration.
In such cases, the court does not directly alter the soft law instrument linked to
117. See CARL FC, supra note 63 at para 92. After a detailed review of their content, Crampton
CJ of the Federal Court held that several portions of the jurisprudential guides crossed this
line. They represented findings of fact that were effectively imposed on Immigration Review
Board members, and thereby infringed their independence. See e.g. ibid at para 140 (for his
findings with respect to the jurisprudential guide (JG) for Pakistan):
Given the foregoing, I consider that at least some Board members in a future case with facts
similar to those in the Pakistan JG would not feel completely free to decide the case according
to his or her own conscience. On the contrary, some Board members are likely to feel pressure
to adopt as his or her own findings the factual determinations the RAD [Refugee Appeal
Division] appears to have made … As a result, their discretion to make factual findings
would be unlawfully fettered and their adjudicative independence would be improperly
constrained or encroached upon. In brief, those Board members would not be entirely free to
make determinations with respect to the facts in question, completely free and in accordance
with his or her own conscience. Moreover, at least some members of the public would likely
reasonably apprehend that some members of the Board would feel pressured in this way and
would therefore not be entirely impartial.

The Federal Court of Appeal reversed this finding and concluded that the use of
jurisprudential guides did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias as decision makers; see
ibid at paras 92-101.
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the decision. However, such a challenge may also highlight a reasonableness flaw
in the guideline itself.
This point is illustrated in Baker, described in Part I(B)(1), above.118 In that
case, the Court concluded that an immigration officer’s deportation decision was
unreasonable for, inter alia, failing to take the best interests of the applicant’s
children into account.119 Although the relevant Ministerial guidelines did not
reference the best interests of the child as a consideration, the majority concluded
that “the failure to give serious weight and consideration to the interests of the
children constitutes an unreasonable exercise of the discretion conferred [by
section 114(2) of the Immigration Act].”120
By finding the immigration officer’s decision unreasonable on this basis,
the Court effectively “wrote in” the best interests of a child as a consideration
in humanitarian and compassionate decisions. The Baker decision spurred the
development of an operational bulletin; this soft law instrument addressed Baker
and altered the weight given to the best interests of the child in immigration
and refugee decision making, both in and outside the humanitarian and
compassionate setting.121 By holding that a specific administrative decision was
unreasonable, the Court thus effectively modified the soft law framework by
which immigration officers make decisions more generally.
Baker suggests that although there is a theoretical distinction between
judicially reviewing a soft law instrument or an administrative decision pursuant
to that instrument, the remedial impacts of a successful application are not
so easily distinguished. In practice, an application to review an administrative
decision may indirectly alter the soft law framework that gave rise to the decision.
In this way, when courts judicially review an administrative decision, the remedial
effects of a successful application often extend beyond the scope of the specific
decision on review.
To blur this distinction even further, some courts have directly modified a soft
law instrument through judicial declarations. For example, in Bilodeau-Masse
v. Canada (Procurer general) (“Bilodeau-Masse”), the Federal Court of Canada
issued a declaratory judgment that effectively supplemented a policy manual.122
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At issue in the Bilodeau-Masse case was the constitutionality of provisions
of the CCRA, which granted the Parole Board of Canada discretion to refuse to
hold an in-person hearing in certain circumstances. The applicant requested an
in-person hearing because he had an intellectual disability.123 The Board, relying
in part on a policy manual, refused to hold an in-person hearing.124 The applicant
sought judicial review of the Board’s decision.
The court granted declaratory relief, stating that the Board must comply
with the principles of fundamental justice and hold an oral hearing in specific
circumstances.125 Justice Martineau’s declaratory judgment guides how the Board
should exercise discretion before refusing to hold an in-person hearing with the
offender. This declaration, effectively, supplemented the policy manual.
In both Baker and Bilodeau-Masse, the subject matter on review was a specific
decision— yet the ramifications of the judicial review directly supplemented soft
law instruments of broader applicability. In this way, the theoretical distinction
between a specific exercise of discretion and the instrument guiding that discretion
often dissolves at the remedial stage.
2.

INVALIDATING SOFT LAW

In addition to modifying or supplementing soft law, some courts have gone even
further and held soft law to be invalid. For example, in Creelman,126 the court
held that an administrative decision was unreasonable because it relied upon an
“invalid” directive.127 The directive at issue, which permitted the commissioner
to reject inmates’ grievances if they were frivolous or vexatious, was held to be an
unlawful expansion of the administrative discretion conferred by regulation.128
In the course of making such a finding, the court stated that the paragraph of the
directive giving rise to the decision was invalid.129
Similarly, in Langenfeld, Justice Copeland declared that the practice of
searching members of the public in the absence of reasonable and probable
grounds before permitting their entry into police headquarters was an unjustifiable
infringement of the Charter.130
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The declaration of invalidity was even more explicit in Greater Vancouver
Transportation Authority, discussed in Part I(B)(2)(iii)(b), above. In that case,
Court ordered that pursuant to section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
the transit authorities’ policies were of no force and effect to the extent of their
inconsistency with section 2(b) of the Charter.131
While the practical effects of soft law remedies may revise, supplement,
or invalidate the guidelines involved, courts have refrained from issuing orders that
compel executive bodies to develop or modify guidelines themselves. As Justice
Binnie put it in Little Sisters, flawed soft law may represent “maladministration,”
but cannot in itself constitute an unlawful breach.132 It is this premise, in our view,
that has held back decision makers and courts from developing an appropriate
account of the role of soft law in our legal system.
E.

CONCLUSION

The sections above demonstrate the many ways that judges have grappled with
soft law. Courts are struggling to develop a cohesive analytic framework to
address accountability over how soft law is used in discretionary decision making.
Without a framework to guide assessments of soft law, it is sometimes easy to
revert to the default position that soft law is non-binding executive policy, and
thus largely lies beyond the scope of judicial intervention.
In our view, however, judicial analysis should not simply amount to a
formalist exercise of categorizing soft law. Indeed, there is a movement in the
recent jurisprudence towards more nuanced assessments of soft law in context.
From the emergence of the doctrine of legitimate expectations to the recent
expansion of Charter review, courts are adopting novel approaches to respond to
the influence of soft law in practice.
Building on these new jurisprudential approaches, we propose a new
analytical framework to assist judges in characterizing and responding to soft law.

II. TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEWING SOFT LAW
As illustrated in the preceding discussion, a dichotomy of “soft law” versus “hard
law” poses theoretical challenges. Soft law is far from a monolith of non-binding
policy instruments. Soft law is capable of functioning both as a binding legal
instrument and as a suggestive administrative aid in the exercise of discretion. Soft
131. Supra note 4 at para 90.
132. Supra note 2 at para 71.
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law may be almost always followed, almost never followed, sometimes followed,
or followed only in specific contexts. All of these different degrees and dynamics
of soft law’s influence ought to be taken seriously so that the instruments that
actually shape public decision making may also shape legal accountability for that
decision making.
In order to address these variations in the influence of soft law, we ought
to move beyond the reductive dichotomy of hard versus soft law and begin to
address soft law on its own terms. In line with this approach, we endorse recent
jurisprudential efforts to bring soft law squarely within the scope of reviewability
by the courts. For example, assessments of whether soft law complies with the
Charter help to ensure that soft law does not become a back door to effect policy
changes unfettered by constitutional constraints.
However, enhancing judicial oversight of soft law brings new theoretical
challenges. In particular, courts currently lack a principled framework to
characterize soft law and fashion a responsive remedy. To help fill this gap,
we propose a new framework to assist in conceptualizing and responding to soft
law in its various instantiations.
A. CHARACTERIZING SOFT LAW

In our view, the key to reviewing soft law is appreciating its impact, and not
just its origins. All soft law instruments should be understood as falling along
a “spectrum of authoritativeness.” This spectrum arises not as a function of the
source of soft law, but rather as a function of its influence. That is to say, a more
formally issued soft law instrument that appears to guide decision making may in
fact be routinely ignored, while an informal statement of policy or practice may
be treated as a de facto requirement by administrative decision maker.
As to where on this spectrum a particular soft law instrument should be
placed, the key question is an empirical one—how is the soft law instrument
actually used? To answer this question, we propose that courts consider the
extent to which the soft law shapes the discretion of decision makers and the
culture of decision making in a public body. This includes the extent to which the
public body requires compliance with the guideline (for example, where training,
education, or internal accountability mandates compliance), bearing in mind
that soft law may harden or loosen over time.
At one of end of the spectrum are authoritative instruments, which will
normally be followed unless there is a clear and justifiable exceptional reason for
a departure from the policy. In the education context, one example is university
codes of conduct for students, staff, and faculty. These codes reflect university
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values such as academic freedom and open discourse, as well as policies and
procedures designed to protect community members from harm and promote
the well-being of the community. They are issued broadly within the authority
granted to universities by legislation. It is clear they are intended to guide conduct
and give rise to consequences for non-compliance.
At the other end of the soft law spectrum are aspirational instruments that
are intended to reflect or signal values and preferences, but which have little (if
any) actual impact on decision makers. For example, universities have adopted
policy instruments which commit them as institutions to end racism, address
climate change, or pursue reconciliation, but these do not come with the same
enforcement mechanisms, for example, as a code of conduct.
Ultimately, regardless of the specific public law context, a spectrum approach
ensures that courts have an expansive and flexible framework to consider soft law
in its various instantiations. Whether a court is reviewing soft law for exceeding
jurisdiction, fettering discretion, or breaching the Charter, the spectrum
approach equips courts with the tools to capture and assess the effects of a soft
law instrument in context. This approach may have practical implications on the
outcome of judicial analysis; for example, a soft law instrument that is treated as
binding may produce Charter violations by removing administrative discretion,
whereas a merely suggestive instrument would not. Under the spectrum approach,
courts will have the tools to capture and assess soft law on its own terms.
B. FASHIONING A REMEDY

A related difficulty when assessing soft law is fashioning an appropriate judicial
response. As outlined above, judges have a wide range of remedial options
where a soft law instrument raises issues; these range from ordering certiorari,
to supplementing the impugned soft law instrument, to declaring it to be invalid.
At present, there is little guidance provided to courts in selecting from the menu
of remedial options available.
While we have stressed the importance of subjecting soft law to meaningful
judicial accountability, courts must also remain cognizant of the division of
powers and respect the limits of the judiciary’s function in the sphere of executive
policy making. As noted in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, in the context of
discussing judicial review:
Courts, while exercising their constitutional functions of judicial review, must be
sensitive not only to the need to uphold the rule of law, but also to the necessity of
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avoiding undue interference with the discharge of administrative functions in respect
of the matters delegated to administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures.133

To respect these principles, we propose that the selection of an appropriate
remedy should be guided by three soft law factors: (1) influence; (2) legitimacy;
and (3) impact on affected rights holders. In our view, highly interventionist
remedies (such as declarations of invalidity) should generally be reserved for cases
where a soft law is highly influential, is ultra vires, or has significant impacts on
affected rights holders.
The first consideration, influence, is relevant at the remedial stage because
it encourages courts to respond to the soft law’s practical impact. Where soft
law is highly influential on a decision maker, its impacts are similar to those
of a formal legal instrument. In such cases, appropriate remedies may be akin
to those applied to impugned laws; these include declarations of invalidity or
modifications to the language used in soft law (for example, where soft law
violates the Charter or exceeds jurisdiction). By contrast, where soft law has
less influence over such decision making, appropriate remedies may align more
closely with those remedies associated with specific exercises of discretionary
decision making. These include certiorari (quashing a decision), or, more rarely,
mandamus (compelling the performance of a legal duty). Rather than solely
focusing on the administrative decision at issue or the legislation according
administrative discretion, we suggest that the soft law itself should form part of
the legal analysis and channel the focus of the resulting remedy.
The second consideration, legitimacy, relates to the jurisdictional basis for
administrative acts. The rule of law dictates that all government action must
comply with the law; as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, “[T]he exercise
of all public power must find its ultimate source in a legal rule.”134 As noted by Paul
Daly, “[C]ourts have concluded [that] administrative bodies should not be able
to expand the limits of their constitutional mandates by making representations
that are beyond their powers.”135 To do so would be ultra vires, and could, in our
view, warrant a declaration of invalidity. As an example, in Creelman, discussed
in Part I(B)(2)(i), above, the court declared a Commissioner’s directive to be
invalid for exceeding the Commissioner’s jurisdiction and conflicting with the
CCRA’s Regulations.136
133. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 27.
134. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 72.
135. Paul Daly, “A Pluralist Account of Deference and Legitimate Expectations,” in Groves &
Weeks, supra note 8 at 118.
136. Supra note 39.
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The third consideration when selecting a remedy is the impact of soft law
on affected rights holders. As noted by Chief Justice McLachlin, “[A] right,
no matter how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided
for its breach.”137 As guardians of the Constitution, the judiciary plays a vital role
in ensuring that those rights are adequately protected.138 Thus, where soft law
infringes on constitutional rights, the judiciary must be empowered to respond
in a manner that protects those rights. For example, in Langenfeld, a declaration
of invalidity was warranted where the impugned soft law mandated searches in a
manner that unjustifiably infringed on the Charter.139
These three inquiries—influence, legitimacy, and impact on rights holders—
are interrelated. Soft law that is more influential will give rise to closer jurisdictional
scrutiny and will often have a measurable impact on affected rights holders.
By contrast, non-binding declarations of policy are less likely to threaten those
legal principles. In any event, where one or more of these factors are engaged (i.e.,
where soft law is highly influential, unlawful, or has a significant impact on rights
holders), the Court’s fundamental functions (safeguarding rights and promoting
the rule of law) are centrally engaged, and more interventionist remedies will
often be warranted.
In sum, the spectrum approach empowers courts to account for the wide
variation in soft law instruments. In applying this approach, however, courts
should be cognizant of the fact that soft law is fluid, and the very act of judicial
analysis can alter its application. For example, in some cases, the very act of
finding that soft law passes judicial scrutiny may prove remedial in the sense
that it modifies soft law’s subsequent application. To illustrate, consider an
administrative policy that prescribes conditions for awarding a licence without
regard to disability. The court may find that this soft law does not violate the
Charter by noting that “nothing in this policy should be read as restricting
decision makers from accommodating applicants with disabilities.” This judicial
statement, standing alone, may encourage administrative decision makers to
direct their mind to accommodating disabilities when exercising discretion under
the policy. In this way, the act of judicial analysis can perform a remedial function
by shaping how administrative decision makers apply soft law in practice.

137. R v 974649 Ontario Inc, 2001 SCC 81 at para 20.
138. Application under s 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42 at para 88.
139. Supra note 9 at para 157.
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C. CONCLUSION

While the spectrum approach equips judges with new analytical framework
to assist in reviewing soft law, there are questions that remain to be explored.
When, for example, should courts review soft law for violating Charter rights (an
approach applied to legislation) or for failing to proportionately balance Charter
values (an approach applied to administrative decision making)? Another related
inquiry is whether a remedy should be awarded under section 52 of the Charter
instead of section 24(1).140 While we would not go so far as to presume any
definitive answers to these questions, we suggest that that courts should be
guided by the authoritativeness inquiry. Soft law can take many forms, from
optional policy guides to binding determinants of administrative discretion;
in our view, a principled response to soft law should be informed by its effects,
rather than its form.
In summary, the spectrum approach provides judges with an analytical
framework to assess soft law on its own terms, rather than in relation to other
concepts. To respond to the practical impacts of a soft law instrument, courts
should consider its degree of authoritativeness. If the court identifies an issue
with the soft law instrument, the selection of an appropriate remedy should
be guided by three factors: the soft law’s (1) influence; (2) legitimacy; and (3)
impact on rights holders. This framework provides a foundational basis that can
be expanded upon over time to assist courts in reviewing soft law instruments.
What difference would the spectrum approach make in future soft law
disputes? To explore this key question, we consider the context of university free
speech policies developed in response to an Ontario Government directive in
2018. This instance of soft law both reflects many of the uncertainties of the
current soft law jurisprudence and demonstrates why a spectrum approach could
improve the coherence of the courts’ response to challenges involving soft law.

III. THE CASE STUDY OF ONTARIO’S COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES FREE SPEECH DIRECTIVE
This section explores the benefits of the spectrum approach through the lens of
recent free speech policies developed by Ontario colleges and universities. Both
the Government’s initiative to compel post-secondary institutions to develop free
speech policies, and the policies themselves, raise a host of issues often associated
140. See the discussion of this issue in Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, supra note 4
at paras 81-90.
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with soft law. In our view, the spectrum approach provides a clearer and more
effective response than a binary framework, which would shield the initiative
from judicial scrutiny.
A. OVERVIEW

To understand the relationship between free speech policies and soft law
principles, it is first necessary to review the unusual history of this initiative.
On 30 August 2018, shortly after a new Conservative provincial government
was sworn in, Ontario’s Office of the Premier published a “backgrounder”141 and
explanatory “news release”142 on the Government of Ontario’s website. These
two publications stipulated that publicly-funded colleges and universities must
develop free speech policies by 1 January 2019 or face potential funding cuts.
In addition, the backgrounder prescribed several minimum policy standards that
post-secondary institutions must adopt. The backgrounder reads in part:
The Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities requires every publicly-assisted
college and university to develop and publicly post its own free speech policy by
January 1, 2019 that meets a minimum standard specified by the government.
Free Speech Policy
The policy must apply to faculty, students, staff, management and guests, and it
must meet a minimum standard by including the following:
•
•

A definition of free speech
Principles based on the University of Chicago Statement on Principles of Free
Expression:
•
Universities and colleges should be places for open discussion and free
inquiry.
•
The university/college should not attempt to shield students from ideas or
opinions that they disagree with or find offensive.
•
While members of the university/college are free to criticize and contest
views expressed on campus, they may not obstruct or interfere with the
freedom of others to express their views.
•
Speech that violates the law is not allowed.

141. Office of the Premier, “Upholding Free Speech on Ontario’s University and College
Campuses” (30 August 2018), online: Government of Ontario <news.ontario.ca/opo/
en/2018/08/upholding-free-speech-on-ontarios-university-and-college-campuses.html>
[Backgrounder].
142. Office of the Premier, News Release, “Ontario Protects Free Speech on Campuses, Mandates
Universities and Colleges to Introduce Free Speech Policy by January 1, 2019” (30 August
2018), online: Government of Ontario <news.ontario.ca/opo/en/2018/08/ontario-protectsfree-speech-on-campuses.html> [“News Release”].
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•
•
•

That existing student discipline measures apply to students whose actions are
contrary to the policy (e.g., ongoing disruptive protesting that significantly
interferes with the ability of an event to proceed).
That institutions consider official student groups’ compliance with the policy
as a condition for ongoing financial support or recognition, and encourage
student unions to adopt policies that align with the free speech policy.
That the college/university uses existing mechanisms to handle complaints and
ensure compliance. Complaints against an institution that remain unresolved
may be referred to the Ontario Ombudsman.

Starting September 2019, each institution must prepare an annual report on
implementation progress and a summary of its compliance, publish it online and
submit it to the Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario (HEQCO).
Monitoring and Compliance
…
If institutions fail to comply with government requirements to introduce and report
on free speech policies, or if they fail to follow their own policies once implemented,
the ministry may respond with reductions to their operating grant funding,
proportional to the severity of non-compliance.143

As this description of the initiative makes clear, a binary approach to this policy
may obscure more than it reveals. On the one hand, the policy is by its own
terms a “requirement” with which all post-secondary institutions are expected
to comply. On the other hand, post-secondary institutions are free to ignore the
policy, provided they are willing to have a reduction in operating grant funding.
Additionally, the backgrounder appears to incorporate by reference
another soft law instrument, the University of Chicago Statement of Principles
on Free Expression (“Chicago Principles”).144 The Chicago Principles are a
set of values that intend to demonstrate a commitment to free expression in
post-secondary institutions. They call for “free, robust, and uninhibited debate
and deliberation among all members of the university community.”145 The
Chicago Principles provide for narrow instances where the university can restrict
or regulate speech; these include where the speech violates the law or where it
would disrupt the ordinary activities of the university.146 However, the Chicago
Principles emphasize that “these are narrow exceptions to the general principle
143. Backgrounder, supra note 141.
144. University of Chicago, “Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression”
(July 2014), online: <provost.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
FOECommitteeReport.pdf>
145. Ibid at 1.
146. Ibid.
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of freedom of expression.”147 The government’s policy seeks to compel colleges
and universities to develop free speech policies that incorporate the Chicago
Principles, which themselves envision limited grounds upon which universities
may regulate free speech.
The free speech initiative announcement sparked a range of responses from
academics, students, advocacy groups, and the general public, but almost all
of these concerned the substance of the announcement, not its form. Some
have commended Premier Ford’s initiative for promoting the free expression of
ideas.148 Others have voiced concerns that the initiative promotes the tolerance of
hateful views towards marginalized groups.149 Some argue that the government’s
announcement undermines the institutional autonomy of post-secondary
institutions.150 Finally, others suggest that the proposed disciplinary measures
may actually inhibit free speech by dissuading students from demonstrating
against controversial views.151
These varied responses are matched by the diverse characterizations of the
Premier’s initiative. Although the substance of the Premier’s message is clear, the
form of the announcement resists straightforward classification. Indeed, there
is a lack of clarity amongst stakeholders regarding what, precisely, they have
been expected to respond to. The initiative has been described in many ways,

147. Ibid.
148. See e.g. Brian Lilley, “LILLEY: Ford government’s free speech policy for schools a good
first step,” Toronto Sun (22 December 2018), online: <torontosun.com/news/provincial/
lilley-ford-governments-free-speech-policy-for-schools-a-good-first-step>; Postmedia
News, “EDITORIAL: Campus free speech policy a necessity,” Toronto Sun (1 January
2019), online: <torontosun.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-campus-free-speech-policya-necessity>; WR Laird, “Opinion: Ontario universities still don’t really want free speech
on campus,” National Post (1 January 2019), online: <nationalpost.com/opinion/
ontario-universities-still-dont-really-want-free-speech-on-campus>.
149. See e.g. James L Turk, “A manufactured crisis: the Ford government’s troubling
free speech mandate” (Fall 2018), online: Academic Matters <academicmatters.
ca/a-manufactured-crisis-the-ford-governments-troubling-free-speech-mandate>.
150. Ibid.
151. See e.g. The Canadian Association of University Teachers, “CAUT critical of Ontario
colleges’ free speech policy” (17 December 2018), online: CAUT <www.caut.ca/
latest/2018/12/caut-critical-ontario-colleges-free-speech-policy>.
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including as a “directive,”152 “requirement,”153 “guidance,”154 guideline,”155 and
even a “policy” in and of itself.156
This conceptual uncertainty remains unresolved in follow-up statements from
the Ontario Premier. For example, in a Twitter post dated 6 January 2019, Ford
writes, “Starting this year, we have made it mandatory for Ontario universities
and colleges to have a policy to protect free speech.”157 In this statement, Premier
Ford sidestepped this terminological confusion by referring to the effect of his
initiative, rather than its form.
The Government’s “free speech” initiative demonstrates the benefits of a
spectrum approach to soft law and the challenges of a traditional approach to soft
law. The binary approach requires that all measures be either “law” or not “law”.
In effect, Ontario colleges and universities were required to adopt specific
protections of free speech. At first glance, this appears to be an example of law.
It is binding, with specific consequences for non-compliance.
However, upon closer inspection, universities are required to adopt this policy
only as a condition of their funding. If universities and colleges are prepared to
accept the funding consequences, they are free to choose not to adopt the policy.
Moreover, the press release does not indicate what funding consequences would
follow non-adoption. A minor financial penalty or the complete withdrawal of
provincial funding could both be possible given the ambiguous language of the
initiative. Further, given that free speech policies themselves are not a legislative
instrument and therefore cannot legally bind university communities, they
are, in effect, being required to adopt a non-binding expression of their values.
Is a free speech policy of a university in some respects akin to “law”? Are the
Chicago Principles, which serve as a minimum standard, themselves binding,
152. Dr. Sara Diamond, “President’s Message” (9 October 2018), online: OCAD University
<www2.ocadu.ca/internal-update/presidents-message-5>.
153. Wilfrid Laurier University, “Freedom of Expression” (7 June 2018), online: <www.wlu.ca/
about/discover-laurier/freedom-of-expression/index.html>.
154. University of Toronto, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ): Free Speech,” online:
<freespeech.utoronto.ca/faq>.
155. Canadian Association of University Teachers, “Ontario ‘free speech’ requirements for
universities and colleges cause for concern” (31 August 2018), online: CAUT <www.caut.ca/
latest/2018/08/ontario-free-speech-requirements-universities-and-colleges-cause-concern>.
156. Turk, supra note 149.
157. Doug Ford, “Starting this year, we have made it mandatory for Ontario universities and
colleges to have a policy to protect free speech. I’ve heard from many students who believe
our campuses need to be a place for respectful and open dialogue, without fear of attacks
or discrimination” (6 January 2019 at 3:33), online: Twitter <twitter.com/fordnation/
status/1082057478253142016?lang=en>.
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given the fact that the principles call for balancing competing imperatives for
universities? The more one wrestles with these questions under the existing soft
law framework, the more slippery the initiative becomes.
Ultimately, the binary approach to “law” and policy” becomes untenable
in the context of the Government’s university free speech initiative. Inexorably,
one is drawn to the conclusion that the free speech requirement is both binding
and not binding and is both law and policy. The authoritative spectrum is ideally
suited both to provide clarity to this mix, and to clarify both the Government’s
and the colleges and universities’ accountability for their actions.
Despite the uncertainties surrounding its inception, the Premier’s
announcement has had a tangible impact, spurring the creation of at least
eighteen free speech policies by 1 January 2019. Complicating the development
of a soft law lens on the initiative is the fact that universities have responded in
diverse ways—some enacted specific, new free speech rules, while others packaged
existing policies and procedures with a statement of principles or aspirations.158
Twenty-four of Ontario’s colleges released a joint policy statement on upholding
free speech,159 while at least seventeen universities developed separate free speech
policies.160 A small number of universities (including the University of Toronto
158. For a Canada-wide perspective on the state of free speech policies prior to the Ontario
initiative, see Craig Forcese, “The Expressive University the Legal Foundations of Free
Expression and Academic Freedom on Canada’s Campuses” (2018), online: <papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3850321>.
159. Colleges Ontario, “Policy Statement on Upholding Free Speech” (17 December
2018), online: <www.collegesontario.org/en/resources/policy-statement-on-upholding-freespeech> [Colleges Ontario].
160. Algoma University, “Algoma University Freedom of Expression Policy” (21 December
2018), online: <employees.algomau.ca/services/wsDocuments/4158> [Algoma University];
Brock University, “Freedom of Expression Policy” (last visited 10 September 2021),
online: <brocku.ca/free-speech> [Brock University]; Carleton University, “Freedom
of Speech Policy” (30 November 2018), online: <carleton.ca/secretariat/wp-content/
uploads/Freedom-of-Speech.pdf> [Carleton University]; Lakehead University, “Free
Expression Policy” (18 December 2018), online (pdf ): <www.lakeheadu.ca/sites/default/
files/uploads/106/policies/Free%20Expression%20Policy.pdf> [Lakehead University];
Laurentian University, “Policy on the Freedom of Speech (Freedom of Expression)” (14
December 2018), online: <laurentian.ca/policy-freedom-of-speech> [Laurentian University];
McMaster University, “McMaster University Summary of Policy Framework: Freedom of
Expression” (December 2018), online (pdf ): <op.mcmaster.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
FoE_Summary-of-Policy-Framework_4Dec18-3.pdf> [McMaster University]; Nipissing
University, “Free Speech (Policy No. 1.10.2018.B)” (December 2018), online: <nipissingu.
ca/sites/default/files/2018-12/Free%20Speech%20Policy%20-%20Dec%202018.pdf>
[Nipissing University]; Ontario College of Art and Design University, “OCAD University
Freedom of Expression Statement and Policies” (10 December 2018), online: <www2.
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and Ryerson University) released statements indicating that their pre-existing free
speech policies conform with the Ontario Government’s requirements.161
All of Ontario universities and colleges responded to the free speech initiative.
While the resulting policies share several commonalities, there are also points of
departure between them:
1. Incorporation of the backgrounder: Some policies reproduce the
principles in the Premier’s announcement ad verbatim,162 while
ocadu.ca/internal-update/presidents-message-5> [Ontario College of Art and Design];
Queen’s University, “Free Expression at Queen’s University” (18 December 2018), online:
<www.queensu.ca/secretariat/policies/administration-and-operations/free-expressionqueens-university-policy> [Queen’s University]; The University of Western Ontario, “Policy
1.54 – Freedom of Expression Policy” (Effective 29 November 2018), online (pdf ): <www.
uwo.ca/univsec/pdf/policies_procedures/section1/mapp154.pdf> [Western University];
Trent University, “Free Speech Policy” (30 November 2018), online (pdf ): <www.
trentu.ca/governance/sites/trentu.ca.governance/files/documents/Free%20Speech%20
Policy%20-%20ACCESSIBLE.pdf> [Trent University]; University of Guelph, “University
of Guelph Policy Statement on Freedom of Expression” (last visited 10 September 2021),
online: <www.uoguelph.ca/freedom-of-expression/policy> [University of Guelph]; University
of Ontario Institute of Technology, “Freedom of Expression Policy” (29 November
2018), online: <usgc.uoit.ca/policy/freedom-of-expression-policy.php> [University of
Ontario Institute of Technology]; University of Ottawa, “Policy 121–Statement on Free
Expression” (12 December 2018), online: <www.uottawa.ca/administration-and-governance/
policy-121-statement-free-expression> [University of Ottawa]; University of Waterloo, “Draft
New Policy 8 – Freedom of Speech” (last visited 10 September 2021), online: <uwaterloo.
ca/secretariat/draft-new-policy-8-freedom-speech> [University of Waterloo]; University of
Windsor, “Policy on Freedom of Expression” (27 November 2018), online (pdf ): <www.
uwindsor.ca/secretariat/sites/uwindsor.ca.secretariat/files/freedom_of_expression_policy_
bg181127.pdf> [University of Windsor]; York University, “Free Speech Statement of Policy”
(December 2018), online: <secretariat-policies.info.yorku.ca/policies/free-speech-statementof-policy> [York University].
161. Ryerson University, “Statement on Freedom of Speech” (4 May 2010), online (pdf ):
<www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/senate/documents/Statement_on_Freedom_of_Speech_
May_04_2010.pdf>. See also Ryerson University, “Freedom of Speech Policies” (last visited
10 September 2021), online: <www.ryerson.ca/freedom-of-speech> [Ryerson University];
University of Toronto, “Statement on Freedom of Speech, 1992” (28 May 1992), online
(pdf ): <www.governingcouncil.utoronto.ca/Assets/Governing+Council+Digital+Assets/
Policies/PDF/ppmay281992.pdf>. See also University of Toronto, “Freedom of Speech at the
University of Toronto” (last visited 10 September 2021), online: <freespeech.utoronto.ca>
[University of Toronto]; Wilfrid Laurier University, “Statement on Free Expression” (29 May
2018), online: <www.wlu.ca/about/discover-laurier/freedom-of-expression/statement.html>.
See also Wilfrid Laurier University, “Freedom of Expression” (last visited 10 September
2021), online: <www.wlu.ca/about/discover-laurier/freedom-of-expression/index.html>
[Wilfrid Laurier University].
162. See e.g. Algoma University, supra note 160; Carleton University, supra note 160; Lakehead
University, supra note 160.
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2.
3.

4.
5.

other policies endeavour to capture the spirit of the backgrounder’s
principles in their own words (and sometimes through other
pre-existing policies).163
Animating policy values: Some free speech policies focus exclusively
on values that pertain to free expression,164 while other policies also
refer to other institutional values, such as diversity and inclusion.165
Protesting rights: Some policies explicitly restrict individuals’ right
to protest where it significantly infringes on the expression of
others;166 by contrast, other institutions affirm the right to protest
as a facet of the right to free speech.167
Application to student associations: Some institutions explicitly
state that student group funding will be contingent on compliance
with the institution’s free speech policy.168
Enforcement mechanisms: Most policies include general statements
linking their free speech policy to pre-existing enforcement
mechanisms, such as disciplinary and complaint procedures.169
However, one policy lays the groundwork for new, policy-specific
complaint procedures.170 Further, another policy explicitly states
that a student may be subject to complaint and disciplinary

163. See e.g. Ryerson University, supra note 161; University of Toronto, supra note 161; Wilfrid
Laurier University, supra note 161.
164. See e.g. Algoma University, supra note 160; Carleton University, supra note 160; Lakehead
University, supra note 160.
165. See e.g. McMaster University, supra note 160; Nipissing University, supra note 160; Ontario
College of Art and Design, supra note 160; Western University, supra note 160; University of
Ontario Institute of Technology, supra note 160; University of Windsor, supra note 160; York
University, supra note 160.
166. See e.g. Trent University, supra note 160; University of Ontario Institute of Technology,
supra note 160.
167. See e.g. the University of Guelph, supra note 160; University of Windsor, supra note 160;
Western University, supra note 160; Wilfrid Laurier University, supra note 160.
168. See Colleges Ontario, supra note 159; Brock University, supra note 160; Queens University,
supra note 160.
169. See e.g. Colleges Ontario, supra note 159; Algoma University, supra note 160; Brock
University, supra note 160; Lakehead University, supra note 160; Laurentian University, supra
note 160; McMaster University, supra note 160; Trent University, supra note 160; University
of Guelph, supra note 160; University of Ottawa, supra note 160; University of Waterloo,
supra note 160; University of Windsor, supra note 160; York University, supra note 160.
170. See the University of Ontario Institute of Technology, supra note 160.
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action for significantly interfering with the ability of others to
express themselves.171
While the ministerial requirement has yet to be subject to judicial consideration,
analogous cases have recently been considered by the courts. For example,
a companion policy to Ontario’s ministerial requirement was challenged by
affected student groups in Canadian Federation of Students v. Ontario.172 This
policy, named the “Student Choice Initiative,” was issued by cabinet order in
December 2018 and altered the funding model for student unions and other
fee-supported activities. In that case, the Ontario Government unsuccessfully
argued that the directive in question was not subject to judicial review. Ontario’s
arguments could have been raised in the free speech context as well:
Ontario says that this application is not justiciable for two reasons:
(a) the impugned directives reflect a “core policy choice” not subject to review before
the courts; and
(b) the impugned directives are exercises of the Crown’s prerogative power over
spending.
Neither argument justifies exempting the impugned directives from judicial review
for legality. To hold otherwise would undercut the supremacy of the legislature and
open the door for government by executive decree, a proposition repugnant to the
core principles of parliamentary democracy.
Although other issues have been raised in this application, we find that this case
turns on whether the impugned directives are consistent with the laws that prescribe
governance for colleges and universities. That is a question of legality and is clearly
justiciable: indeed, it lies at the very heart of the court’s public law mandate.173

The Divisional Court found the directive was invalid, as it was inconsistent with
the statutory context governing colleges and universities, and their decision
making with respect to student unions’ funding and membership in particular:
University and college student associations are private not-for profit corporations.
Ontario does not fund these associations directly or indirectly. Ontario does
not control these associations directly or indirectly. There is no statutory
authority authorizing Cabinet or the Minister to interfere in the internal
affairs of these student associations.
Universities are private, autonomous, self-governing institutions. They are “publicly
assisted” but not publicly owned or operated. For more than 100 years, Ontario has
171. See Carleton University, supra note 160.
172. 2019 ONSC 6658, aff’d 2021 ONCA 553.
173. Ibid at paras 5-6.
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had a legislated policy of non-interference in university affairs, reflected in private
legislative Acts conferring on university governing councils and senates the authority
and responsibility to manage university affairs. There is no statutory authority
authorizing Cabinet or the Minister to interfere in the internal affairs of universities
generally, or in the relations between universities and student associations
specifically.174

In the result, the student choice initiative was quashed.
In addition to judicial review on administrative law grounds, it is increasingly
clear that soft law affecting university rights holders may also give rise to Charter
challenges. In UAlberta Pro-Life v. Governors of the University of Alberta,175
a student organization challenged, inter alia, a university’s decision to dismiss a
complaint relating to a pro-life organization’s protesting rights under a university
policy. Justice Watson (concurring) held that a university’s decision whether
to permit a pro-life advocacy organization to hold an event on campus and to
express its point of view was governed by section 2(b) of the Charter. Similarly,
in Pridgen v. University of Calgary (“Pridgen”),176 Justice Paperny (concurring)
indicated that the Charter applied to a university committee’s decision to impose
disciplinary sanctions on students for social media posts.
The case of Ontario universities’ free speech policies strongly resembles
the case of Pridgen. In Pridgen, the University of Calgary’s review committee
was delegated statutory authority to review university disciplinary decisions.
Similarly, in Ontario, each institution’s Board of Governors and Senate has
been delegated statutory authority to issue policies that affect the functions of
their respective universities. Like the review committee’s decision, the Board of
Governors or Senate’s exercise of statutory authority would attract the application
of the Charter.
Accepting that Ontario universities’ free speech policies fall within the ambit
of the Charter, it is possible to conceive of the application of Charter review on a
variety of grounds (examples include sections 2(b) and 7).177 However, the nature
and success of such a challenge would depend upon the specific free speech
policy at issue, as well as its position on the soft law spectrum. Certain soft law
policies appear to have a high level of authoritativeness and strongly shape the
University’s exercise of delegated discretion. For example, Carleton University’s
174.
175.
176.
177.

Ibid at paras 7-8.
2020 ABCA 1.
2012 ABCA 139 at para 78.
The free speech policies outlined in the Ontario Government’s initiative arguably inhibit the
ability to counter-protest, which implicates s 2(b) of the Charter. In addition, the policies
arguably interfere with the prevention of hate speech, which may engage s 7 concerns.
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free speech policy indicates that students whose actions violate the policy “are
subject to complaint and disciplinary action pursuant to the Student Rights and
Responsibilities Policy. Such violations include, but are not limited to engaging
in disruption that significantly interferes with the ability of an event to proceed
or the ability of others to express themselves.”178
Other examples of authoritative policies could include those that change the
funding of student unions. Where soft law is at the more authoritative end of
the spectrum, the policy, guideline, or code itself may be challenged, in addition
to decisions taken under it—whether on procedural or substantive grounds,
or on the basis of Charter rights or values.
By contrast, other examples of soft law appear more permissive, aspirational,
and non-authoritative. For instance, the University of Ottawa’s free speech policy
(“Policy 121—Statement on Free Expression”) includes a number of guiding
principles to promote free speech, which are less directly tied to mechanisms of
enforcement.179 As a result, these policies are more likely to be viewed as a specific
exercise of administrative discretion.
These variations in free speech policies will also influence the selection of
a remedy. For example, authoritative policies akin to Carleton University’s are
more influential, in the sense that they are more likely to guide student conduct.
While there is no clear reason to suggest such policies are unlawful, they also
have a significant impact on rights holders; for example, the threat of disciplinary
action may create a chilling effect on counter-protesting and other expressive
activities under section 2(b) of the Charter. By contrast, aspirational policies such
as the University of Ottawa’s are less likely to be influential, are clearly lawful, and
have a limited impact on rights holders and their expressive acts.
We turn now to a consideration of how the spectrum approach we have set out
might be applied in the context of the Ontario universities’ free speech policies.
B. APPLYING THE SPECTRUM APPROACH TO THE REVIEW OF SOFT LAW

The first step in the proposed analysis involves placing the soft law on a spectrum
of authoritativeness.

178. Carleton University, supra note 160.
179. University of Ottawa, supra note 160.
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1.

THE MINISTERIAL REQUIREMENT THAT POST-SECONDARY
INSTITUTIONS ADOPT FREE SPEECH POLICIES

To determine how the events above fit into a soft law framework, we must first
consider the nature of the free speech policy: a government press release on 30
August 2018. As noted above, the characterization of the policy shifted depending
on the context. It was variously referred to as a “requirement,” “directive,”
“guideline,” and “policy.” Under the spectrum approach, the source of the soft
law is relevant to, but not determinative of, its legal status.
The spectrum analysis developed above helps to capture the nature of the
policy initiative. Rather than examining the form of the initiative, the spectrum
analysis focuses on its effect.
The ministerial announcement appears to be at the more authoritative end
of the spectrum. Notwithstanding its informal character, the influence on the
policy-making discretion accorded to institutions was high. It contained an explicit
statement that fiscal consequences may follow in the event of non-compliance.
In so doing, it resulted in every post-secondary institution developing, modifying,
or adopting free speech policies. The principles articulated in the announcement
have been incorporated—sometimes ad verbatim—into each institution’s
resultant free speech policy.180 While the precise mechanism of enforcement is
not specified, this public announcement contains clear language to signal to
post-secondary institutions that they had little choice but to follow the policy.
Having characterized the free speech directive, there are a number of grounds
upon which it could be subject to review by the courts. To name a few, one could
argue that the Government’s issuance of the directive was unreasonable; that
the Government lacked jurisdiction to issue the directive; that the Government
unduly fettered the discretion of colleges and universities; or that the directive
was not Charter compliant.
With respect to the issue of unreasonableness, it would be possible to argue
that the Minister did not justify the imposition of the free speech policy in a
way that would meet the more exacting standards set out in Vavilov.181 Although
the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities is granted discretion to
oversee many administrative functions (such as granting degrees and distributing
provincial funding), it has not been granted the power to establish university
policies. Instead, policy-making functions are delegated to the Board of
180. See e.g. Algoma University, supra note 160; Carleton University, supra note 160; Lakehead
University, supra note 160.
181. Supra note 29.
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Governors and Senate under each university’s constituting statute.182 This
statutory backdrop must be considered against the directive’s significant degree
of authoritativeness. Taken together, one could question whether there was a
clear and coherent rationale for the Minister to intervene in the post-secondary
governance of free speech.
There are a number of arguments that can be made respecting the Charter.
As a preliminary matter, one must consider whether to frame the challenge as a
violation of Charter rights (an approach applied to legislation) or Charter values
(an approach applied to administrative decisions). On the latter approach, the
question would be whether the free speech directive interfered with the authority
of colleges or universities to strike the balance between freedom of speech and
protection from harm resulting from speech.183
In the event that the court finds one of the above challenges to be successful,
the next step is to consider the appropriate remedy. The spectrum approach
dictates that the appropriate remedy should be determined with reference to
three factors: (1) influence, (2) legitimacy, and (3) impact on rights holders. Each
factor is briefly considered below.
1. Influence: The announcement has a significant degree of
influence on post-secondary institutions. As noted above, despite
the informal character of the announcement, the linking of
the policy to government funding of Universities and colleges
led to the development of dozens of free speech policies by all
affected institutions.
2. Legitimacy: The announcement arguably constitutes an unlawful
encroachment on each university’s statutory authority to determine
its own educational policies, as the policy directed the content of
the University free speech protections.
3. Impact on rights holders: The announcement arguably has a
significant impact on rights holders. Although the announcement
does not directly implicate students’ rights (in contrast to the policy
affecting the funding of student organizations), the announcement
could undermine university protections surrounding hate speech.
In addition, it arguably interferes with freedom of expression rights

182. See e.g. Ontario College of Art and Design University Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 8, Sched E,
s 6(1)(e); An Act Respecting Lakehead University, SO 1965, c 54, s 14.
183. This a framework was applied in another educational setting by the Court in
Loyola, supra note 33.
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of post-secondary institutions as well as the rights of students, staff,
and faculty at those institutions.
Taken together, each of these factors points to the selection of a more
interventionist remedy. For example, in the context of a Charter challenge,
remedies could involve an order modifying the policy or declaring the policy to
be invalid. If the challenge were brought on Charter values grounds, the remedy
may be to find the policy to be unreasonable.
2.

THE INSTITUTIONS’ RESULTING FREE SPEECH POLICIES

In addition to challenging the government’s ministerial directive, one might also
challenge the resulting university policies themselves.
There is not one but many answers to the question of whether the university
policies are comparably authoritative to “law,” which can give rise to accountability,
whether on judicial review or under a Charter challenge. Based on the soft law
spectrum discussed above, at least some of the institutional free speech policies
adopted in response to the ministerial directive could be vulnerable to judicial
review on administrative law or Charter grounds.
Given that free speech-related soft law results from discretionary choices
made by universities and colleges, it is perhaps more likely that a Charter values
analysis will apply than a Charter challenge, per se. Either way, if the soft law is
an authoritative basis for the decisions which engage the Charter, it is the soft law
itself which should be the focus of the analysis.
As the Ontario universities and colleges’ free speech policy case study
demonstrates, the diversity of soft law calls for a flexible and adaptable framework
of legal accountability. The analysis must be rooted in how soft law actually shapes
decision making, and not only its formal status as “law” or “policy.”

IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have argued that soft law must be treated as a separate and
distinct area of inquiry in Canadian public law, not as an ancillary issue to
other questions.
The treatment of soft law in Canadian jurisprudence is an issue that warrants
further exploration. If soft law is not “law,” as Justice Binnie asserted in Little
Sisters, then it falls outside the sphere governed by the Constitution. However,
in Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, Justice Deschamps equated soft
law with the manner in which law is exercised or applied, and therefore, just as
discretionary decision making may be subject to the Charter, so too may soft law
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be subject to Charter scrutiny. These are two sides of the same coin. In each case,
courts attempt to define soft law in relation to something else (either in opposition
to hard law, or in similarity to discretionary decision making). What we lack is a
framework for considering soft law on its own terms within Canadian public law.
The case study of university and college free speech policies in Ontario
illustrates the importance of developing a comprehensive soft law framework
to review government and administrative action. The Government of Ontario’s
announcement did not flow from legislation, regulation, or even contractual
revisions to the funding agreements between the Government and each university.
In this sense, the directive could not qualify as “hard law”; however, its terms were
at the high end of the authoritativeness spectrum and spawned the development
of a host of free speech policies that have had tangible impacts on college and
university campuses.
An authoritativeness spectrum of soft law allows for the public law analysis
to take into account the practical significance of government initiatives and to
subject them to meaningful review. Ultimately, the framework proposed in this
article seeks to encourage government accountability and to uphold the rule of
law by ensuring that the soft law instruments are not immune from meaningful
oversight by the courts. As Greg Weeks has written, “It is because soft law
means something that we care at all whether the law responds to it. Soft law
means something because it is treated by the majority of those faced with it as
though it does.”184
Our hope is that, in the future, soft law will be assessed in its context
and will no longer be expressed as ancillary to other concepts. In other words,
our aim is not to “harden” soft law, but rather to put the focus on how soft
law shapes administrative decision making, and to enhance accountability
for the development and application of soft law in public decision making.
In this way, we hope that soft law may finally find its place in the firmament of
Canadian public law.

184. See Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities, supra note 3 at 268.

